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RADIATION INJURIES: STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS INADEQUACIES IN TORT CASESt 
Samuel D. Estep* and Thomas W. Van Dyke** 
IN 1963 Consolidated Edison Company, which supplies electric-ity to the New York City metropolitan area, announced its 
intent to build a very large nuclear reactor in the middle of that 
city's millions of inhabitants.1 Predictably, there was a loud and 
mixed reaction by various groups to the possible danger this might 
create for the general public, as distinguished from the workers 
who would operate the plant. One former chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission announced his opposition to such schemes 
because so many people would be endangered by harmful expo-
sure to radiation if it should accidentally be discharged beyond 
the reactor site.2 After substantial periods of operation the cores 
of such reactors inevitably contain large amounts of radioactive 
fission products. Even The New York Times editorially questioned 
the advisability of the proposed site for the same reasons.8 Some 
suggested that the city's legislative council should prohibit such 
construction.4 The ultimate decision in the dispute, however, will 
be made by the AEC because constitutionally the federal govern-
ment has paramount power and, in the opinion of the present 
writers,15 in the Atomic Energy Act of 19546 Congress superseded 
all local regulatory power regarding nuclear safety in the siting 
of such reactors. In the light of this conclusion, the reaction to 
t Acknowledgment is gratefully made to the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Project, the 
Ford Foundation, and the W. W. Cook Endowment Fund for financial support of the 
research on which this article is based. 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
•• Member of the Missouri Bar.-Ed. 
1 N.Y. Times, May IO, 1963, p. 1, col. 4; Time, July 26, 1963, p. 42. 
2 Lecture, "Whatever Happened to the Peaceful Atom?" delivered at Princeton 
University, Feb. 19, 1963. On the other side, see CONG. REc.-Appendix A5657 (remarks 
of Representative Holifield} (Sept. 9, 1963). 
s N.Y. Times, May 31, 1963, p. 24, col. 5. 
4 See note 1 supra. 
15 See STASON, ESTEP &: PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1002-74 (1959) [hereinafter cited 
as ATOMS AND THE LAw]. See also Estep &: Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: 
An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41, 58-63 (1961). For an 
earlier discussion, see Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peace-
time Private Atomic Energy Activities, 52 MICH. L. REv. 333 (1954). 
6 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1958). 
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the announcement of still another group focuses upon a problem 
which is more important to lawyers and to their clients. 
The New York State Association of Trial Lawyers declared its 
intent to draft and seek enactment of legislative provisions to 
"overcome the absence of adequate common and statutory law on 
the liability arising from accidents caused by atomic development 
projects."7 For some years a few lawyers have been warning the 
bar and the legislatures that existing rules were not adequate to 
handle the legal problems presented in radiation exposure cases. 
An analysis of many of these problems is available elsewhere,8 but 
there is one problem which has had very little and certainly inade-
quate attention in the opinion of the present writers, i.e., how 
long after exposure to radiation should a potential plaintiff be 
permitted to sue the allegedly liable defendant? 
Some injuries from overexposure to radiation may manifest 
themselves within existing statutory limitations periods, at least 
under some liberal ( or loose) judicial interpretations. Many in-
jurious manifestations, however, will not arise for a great many 
years after exposure; it is the thesis of this article that some new 
legislative solutions must be adopted. Limiting the right to sue 
to the existing time periods as construed by many courts will be 
manifestly unfair to plaintiffs. A blanket, unconditional extension 
of the time period to as much as thirty years for all cases regardless 
of the local rule as to when the cause of action accrues, however, 
will place unrealistic burdens on defendants. This article, after 
first analyzing in detail the impact and inadequacies of existing 
statutory time limitations for radiation cases, will outline some 
more realistic provisions which legislatures should enact. The 
analysis here will be limited to general tort liability cases, work-
men's compensation problems already having been considered in 
a companion article.9 
One further initial comment should be made. The AEC will 
have a difficult task in balancing the competing interests which 
bear upon the request of Consolidated Edison Company to build 
in the heart of New York City.* Responsible sources claim that at 
long last competitive nuclear power is no longer just around the 
corner, but is a present reality if huge generating stations are 
built. The proof of these claims, however, lies in the building of 
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1963~ p. 21, col. I. 
8 ATOMS AND THE LAW 1002-74. 
9 Estep &: Allan, Radiation Injuries and Time Limitations in Workmen's Compensa-
tion Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1963). 
• After this article was in type, Consolidated Edison announced that it is withdrawing 
its application at this time. Atomic Indus. Forum Memo, Jan. 1964, p. 5. · 
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operating plants. Clearly the economics of nuclear power will be 
much better if the plants can be built close to the main consumers, 
i.e., large population concentrations. On the other hand, no re-
sponsible scientist or engineer will assert categorically that a large 
nuclear power plant cannot under any circumstances discharge 
extremely dangerous radioactive material beyond the confines of 
the reactor site. The AEC, therefore, conceivably could deny Con-
solidated's request. Nevertheless, neither this nor similar action 
would significantly decrease the need for modification of statute of 
limitations provisions. Although the numerous commercial power 
reactors already built, under construction, or definitely planned, 
are not so close to so many people as that proposed in New York 
City, they are not at isolated sites far from human populations. 
If a substantial accident should occur under the right conditions~ 
certainly hundreds or thousands of the general public could be 
endangered, although in most accidents to date only employees 
have been exposed.10 Even more important perhaps in measuring 
the need for immediate legal action is the potential hazard created 
by transporting large quantities of radioactive waste from reactor 
sites to burial grounds, and by the many thousands of much smaller 
radiation sources now authorized under AEC license. Therefore, 
it is now time to make some changes in our laws; the Consolidated 
Edison request serves only to dramatize the problem. The limita-
tions difficulty exists no matter how the questions of whether to 
apply strict liability or negligence rules, of which types of injuries 
to cover, and of how to prove causal connection are answered.11 
The statute of limitations problem cannot be avoided; enactment 
of adequate statutory rules should not be delayed. 
PRESENT LAW ON STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
A. When the Limitation Period Begins 
In deciding whether or not an action is barred, the initial 
determination usually involves the question of when the statute 
10 See, e.g., Gomberg, Bassett 8: Velez, Report on the Possible Effects on the Surround-
ing Population of an Assumed Release of Fission Products into the Atmosphere from 
!100-Megawatt Reactor Located at Lagoona Beach, Michigan (1957). For listings of actual 
accidents, see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Employee Radiation Hazards and Workmen's 
Compensation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 855-58 (1959); Goodman, Radiation Injuries, 5 ATOMIC 
ENERGY L.J. 20 (196!1); Saenger, Radiation Accidents, 84 AM. J. RoENTGENOLOGY 715, 722 
(1960). 
11 See detailed analysis of these questions in ATOMS AND THE LAw. See also Estep, 
Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 
59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). 
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started to run. Approximately ninety percent of the state statutes 
mark the beginning of the limitation period at the time the cause 
of action "accrued."12 Of the remaining states, Florida and Wiscon-
sin provide that an action shall be brought "within" the specified 
period;13 Pennsylvania requires that suit be filed within a certain 
number of years "from the time when the injury was done";14 
Delaware and Louisiana measure the period from the date the 
damages or injuries "were sustained";15 in Connecticut suit must 
be brought within a specified time "from the date of the act or 
omission complained of."16 For certain tort actions involving in-
juries to the person or to real and personal property, Connecticut 
has established two limitation periods: "within one year from the 
date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered," and 
"except that no such action may be brought more than three years 
from the date of the act or omission complained of."17 Most of these 
statutory standards are relatively flexible, thus allowing the courts 
substantial discretion in deciding when the requisite circumstances 
existed which gave rise to a claim as a matter of substantive law.18 
The Missouri legislature, however, has prescribed definite criteria 
for determining the date of accrual: "[T]he cause of action shall not 
be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical 
breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting 
therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and, if more 
than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting 
damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief ob-
tained."19 
Despite the apparent uniformity in statutory language, judicial 
construction of limitations statutes has resulted in a variety of 
approaches for selecting the point of time from which the period 
should be measured. Although the approaches are sometimes diffi-
cult to categorize, the subsequent discussion analyzes two princi-
pal lines of authority which are further divided into variations on 
each approach.20 The majority of decisions designate the time 
12 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (1947). 
13 FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 95, § 11 (1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 330.19 (1958). 
14 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 31 (1953). 
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8118 (Supp. 1962); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3537 (West 
1953). 
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (1960). 
17 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1960). 
18 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitation, 63 liARv. L. REv. 1177, 1200 
(1950). 
19 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.100 (1949). 
20 Compare McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, & Dejarnette, The Statute of 
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when the negligence or wrong occurred as the point of accrual of 
a cause of action. On the other hand, there appears to be a growing 
body of authority which measures the limitation period from the 
date on which the plaintiff had notice of his injury, or, in at least 
two cases, from the time the causal connection was ascertained by 
the injured party. 
I. At the Time of Negligence or Wrong 
In any action brought to recover damages caused by the tor-
tious conduct of the defendant, the claimant must allege and prove 
that some legally protected interest has been invaded and, in 
order to recover more than nominal damages, that he has incurred 
an actual loss.21 Therefore, it seems illogical to say that the statute 
of limitations started running prior to a legally compensable in-
vasion of a protected interest, because it would be impossible to 
sustain an action without that essential element. This, however~ 
is precisely the result which at least two courts have reached.22 In 
both cases the defendants' wrongful conduct had occurred some 
years prior to the actual effect upon the plaintiffs. In one of the 
decisions, the anomalous result can be attributed to the selection by 
the Connecticut legislature of the language, "from the date of the 
act or omission complained of."23 But the statute involved in the 
other decision employed the typical language of accrual; more-
over, the court specifically recognized that the plaintiff could not 
have maintained an action before he had suffered an injury to his 
property caused by defendant's negligence.24 Nevertheless, the 
court declared that recovery could not be permitted for negligent 
conduct occurring at an earlier date not within the statutory 
period, even though suit was brought shortly after the injurious 
Limitations Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 349 
(1959), where five possible points of time are mentioned with respect to when the limitation 
period could start running. 
21 For example, in a suit based on negligent conduct of the defendant. PROSSER, 
TORTS 165 (2d ed. 1955). 
22 Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952) (applying a Connecticut 
statute); Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, l S.E.2d 818 (1939). See also Powers 
v. Planters Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13 S.E.2d 431 (1941). 
23 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (1960) (formerly § 8324). The Connecticut Supreme 
Court avoided a literal application of the statute in a case involving facts similar to those 
in Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co. by construing the plaintiff's claim as one for failure 
to warn "that the defendant, although knowing that the cartridge, if defective, would be 
an inherently dangerous article and a source of unreasonable risk of injury to those who 
might use it, permitted it to be available for future use without indicating by label or 
otherwise the danger to which the user would expose himself." Thus, defendant's course 
of conduct continued to the time of injury, at which time the statute began to run. Handler 
v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 321, 130 A.2d 793, 795 (1957). 
24 Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 311, 1 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1939). 
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impact on plaintiff's property. Although it is unreasonable to hold 
that a claim can be barred by a limitation before the cause of action 
arises, these two decisions indicate that the defense may be success-
ful when the wrongful conduct precedes the injury by a substantial 
period of time. 
Obviously, such authority would be applicable in a radiation 
incident, especially if there were a significant time lapse between 
the negligent release of radioactive material and the actual ex-
posure of the persons or property of those ultimately harmed. F:or 
example, disposal of waste products in a river, or even in a large 
lake or an ocean, might eventually contaminate the land of ripar-
ian owners or fish which are caught and sold. The wrongful con-
duct was the improper disposal and, applying the above analysis, 
the statute would begin to run from that time. However, the better 
reasoned decisions involving analogous circumstances have re-
jected that argument and have designated the time when the con-
duct resulted in injury to the plaintiff as the point from which the 
limitation statute began to run.25 Even if the more reasonable 
approach were taken in these circumstances, the principal charac-
teristic of radiation injuries which creates significant problems in 
avoiding an unreasonable limitations bar is the substantial delay 
between actual exposure and manifestation of the physical effects. 
Usually a defendant's wrongful act and the resulting injury to 
a plaintiff's person or property are contemporaneous. Factual 
situations are not uncommon, however, in which the plaintiff is 
without notice of any wrongful conduct or any harm that he has 
suffered, although there may have been an invasion of his legally 
protected interests which has the potential for causing significant 
injury with the passage of time. Illustratively, a variety of items, 
including surgical sponges, rubber tubes, forceps, and broken 
needles, have been left in incisions following operations. The 
patient seldom realizes it until the foreign body reaction has mani-
fested itself to such an extent that subsequent surgery is required 
and the object is found during the later operation.26 Not infre-
quently the courts have held that the patient's action accrued at 
the moment the defendant allegedly committed his act constituting 
the malpractice, thereby barring the claim without a real opportu-
nity for the plaintiff to obtain relief.27 In addition, numerous cases 
25 See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Foley v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949). 
26 See, e.g., Capucci v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929) (sponge); Thatcher 
v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943) (surgical needle). 
27 E.g., Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936) (cause of action accrued 
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involving latent injuries caused by exposure to deleterious sub-
stances have raised the limitation issue, and the courts have often 
sustained the position that the injury occurred when there was a 
wrongful invasion of personal or property rights, for at that mo-
ment liability for the wrongful exposure arose.28 
One further illustration of a plaintiff without notice of his 
cause of action involves the situation where faulty workmanship 
results in the early deterioration of a structure, the consequential 
damage being the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct. It has been held that the legal wrong occurred at the time 
the work was performed, and the damages subsequently discovered 
merely enhanced the loss resulting from that wrong.29 
The three situations just described, and undoubtedly numer-
ous others, are clearly analogous to the circumstances which will 
arise in radiation incidents. Because such cases will likely provide 
the judicial precedent for the interpretation of existing limitation 
statutes as applied to delayed manifestation radiation injuries, it 
becomes imperative to understand the courts' analysis in deciding 
when a cause of action accrued. 
In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.,30 the New 
York Court of Appeals articulated the rationale for starting the 
limitation period at that point of time when the facts first exist 
which would permit the plaintiff to succeed in an action against 
the defendant. At the moment of a wrongful invasion of personal 
or property rights a cause of action accrues, even though the in-
jured party may be unaware of the existence of the wrong or in-
jury.31 Moreover, although "consequential damages may flow from 
an injury too slight to be noticed at the time it is inflicted," a new 
cause of action does not arise when such consequential damages 
are manifested.32 With respect to the amount of the recovery in an 
action brought shortly after the right accrues, the court suggested 
when defendant failed to remove some of the radium beads used for cancer therapy on 
the specified date for termination of the treatment); Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. 424 (1872) 
(statute commenced to run the day defendant unskillfully set and treated plaintiff's 
fractured and dislocated arm). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961). 
28 E.g., Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn. 1954); Schmidt v. 
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936); Grant v. Fisher 
Flouring Mills Co., 181 Wash. 576, 44 P.2d 193 (1935). 
29 Kennedy v. Johns-Manv~Ile Sales Corp., 135 Conn. 176, 62 A.2d 771 (1948); cf. 
White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941), where an action for the negligent 
installation of a lightning rod was held not to be barred, because the mere possibility 
of injury would not have been sufficient to impose liability when the rod was installed. 
30 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936). 
31 Id. at 300, 200 N.E. at 827. 
32 Ibid.; accord, Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917). 
760 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
that "so far as such consequential damages may be reasonably antic-
ipated, they may be included in a recovery for the original injury, 
though even at the time of the trial they may not yet exist."83 No 
mention is made, however, of consequential damages which could 
not be "reasonably anticipated," and presumably there could be 
no recovery for such damages. 
If suit were brought at an early date when the potential loss 
is too uncertain to meet the standard for recovery, res judicata 
would preclude a second action when consequential damages are 
subsequently ascertained.34 On the other hand, if the injured party 
awaits development of the consequential damages before bringing 
an action, his remedy will probably be barred by the statute of 
limitations. In order to avoid the limitations bar in this latter 
situation, the injured party must prove that at the time of impact 
the potentiality of future damage was so indefinite that full pros-
pective damages were not recoverable, and, therefore, the statute 
should not run prior to maturation of substantial harm.315 But this 
places the onerous burden on the plaintiff of proving that damages 
which have actually developed could not have been "reasonably 
anticipated" at the time of the initial injury. Adding to the dilem-
ma of the plaintiff is the fact that often he has no notice of either 
the wrongful conduct or the slight harm he has immediately sus-
tained, which makes it virtually impossible to obtain judicial re-
lief in many of the cases involving latent injuries. 
In a recent decision the New York Court of Appeals applied 
the Schmidt analysis in a suit for radiation-induced injuries.86 A 
product sold by the defendant had been injected into plaintiff's 
sinuses for the purpose of making them perceptible in X-rays. 
Part of the substance, which was allegedly radioactive, remained 
in plaintiff's head and produced a carcinoma resulting in the loss 
of an eye fourteen years after the injection. The New York limita-
tion period for claims based on negligence is three years.87 The 
action was brought within two years after the eye was removed 
33 Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300-01, 200 N.E. 824, 
827 (1936). See ATOMS AND THE LAw 262 for a discussion of the standard of proof required 
to prove future injury. See also Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1010 (1933), regarding standards with 
respect to future pain and suffering. 
84 The doctrine of merger would foreclose a second suit if plaintiff had obtained 
judgment in the first action, and if the defendant had been successful in the earlier 
suit he could plead the judgment in bar. See BLUME, AMERICAN CML PROCEDURE 354-55 
(1955). 
85 See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1206. 
86 Schwartz v. Hayden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y .2d 212, 190 N.E.2d 253, 237 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963). 
87 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Ac:r § 214(6). 
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and the plaintiff learned the supposed cause of his injury. Al-
though recognizing that an action accrues only when there has 
been actual harm to the plaintiff, the court adopted the view ex-
pressed in Schmidt and assumed that the radioactive substance 
acted immediately upon the plaintiff's internal tissue. Thus, even 
though some actual deterioration of a plaintiff's bodily structure 
must occur before the statute begins to run, the immediate ion-
izing effect when human tissue is exposed to radioactive material38 
apparently will satisfy this requirement. A person who has un-
knowingly been exposed to nuclear radiation is therefore pre-
cluded from recovering for any serious physical effects which 
develop, since his action will be barred under the usual interpreta-
tion of limitations statutes. 
The fact that plaintiff received notice of a slight injury, al-
though he lacked knowledge of the full potential harm, has been 
a significant factor in certain cases.89 Illustratively, in two actions 
brought in Florida each plaintiff suffered injuries which had devel-
oped from allegedly negligent X-ray treatment. In one, plaintiff 
experienced no burns or other reaction immediately, but developed 
sores several years later;40 the other claimant suffered slight burns 
and an erythema reaction at the time of treatment, resulting in a 
cancerous condition some years subsequent.41 In the former suit 
the statute of limitations was held not to start running until plain-
tiff had notice of her injury, i.e., when the sores developed. The 
latter action, however, was barred because the limitation period 
was calculated from the date of defendant's negligence, since the 
plaintiff was put on notice of the invasion of a legal right. If a per-
son were informed that he had been negligently exposed to a cer-
tain level of radiation, without experiencing immediate ill effects, 
would this be sufficient notice for his cause of action to accrue? 
Assuming that it would, he is then faced with the burden of prov-
ing consequential damages which are "reasonably anticipated," or 
possibly awaiting the development of actual injury which may 
occur at a time when his remedy is foreclosed by a limitations 
period. 
To avoid the harsh result of just claims being barred, some 
courts have developed a theory of continuing negligence. When a 
series of breaches occurs or a particular relationship continues 
which existed when the ·wrongful act was committed, these courts 
88 See ATOMS AND TIIE LAw 10-35. 
80 E.g., Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917). 
40 City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954). 
41 Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So. 2d 70 (Fla. App. 1958). 
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hold that the limitation period starts on the date of the last breach 
in the series or at the termination of the relationship.42 The re-
lationship theory has been used frequently in circumstances where, 
because of improper working conditions,43 an employee incurred 
a lung disease from the inhalation of dust, fumes, or other delete-
rious substance for an extended time, or where a physician's omis-
sion or neglect resulted in a latent injury, but the doctor-patient 
relationship continued for some time after the specific act of mal-
practice.44 The continuing tort theory has been employed success-
fully in litigation not involving employment or the doctor-patient 
relationship. Cases have arisen in which people residing in the 
vicinity of industrial plants have suffered latent personal injury, 
and sometimes property damage, as the result of chronic exposure 
to dusts or toxic elements negligently emitted by the plants. Soine 
courts have placed the beginning of the limitation period at the 
date of last exposure in order to save plaintiffs' remedy from the 
statutory bar.45 Clearly, such authority will be applicable to some 
suits for recovery of damages caused by chronic exposure to radia-
tion-for example, the continual discharge of radioactive dust 
particles over a residential area from a nuclear power plant in 
which the safety devices have become defective. Application of 
this doctrine, however, may depend upon the manner in which 
the complaint is framed, because under these cases the defendant's 
wrongful conduct must continue during the entire period of ex-
posure or throughout the relationship.46 
Attempts to utilize the continuing tort theory have been made 
in cases where there was neither a continuous exposure nor a con-
tinuing relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Con-
fronted with a limitations bar if an action were based on the 
defendant's original negligent act, a few claimants suffering from 
latent injuries have alleged that the defendant had a continuing 
42 See Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277, 289 (1950). 
43 E.g., Rowe v. Gatl<e Corp., 126 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1942); Plazak v. Allegheny Steel, 
324 Pa. 422, 188 Atl. 130 (1936); Tennessee Eastman Corp. v. Newman, 22 Tenn. App. 
270, 121 S.W .2d 130 (1938). Contra, Columbus Mining Co. v. Walker, 271 S.W.2d 276 
(Ky. 1954). 
44 E.g., Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Gillette v. Tucker, 
67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902). 
45 Reynolds Metals v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958); Berry v. Franklin Plate 
Glass Corp., 66 F. Supp. 863 (W.D. Pa. 1946), affd, 161 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
332 U.S. 767 (1947). 
· 46 For instance, a claim for malpractice might charge the defendant with permitting 
a foreign object to remain in plaintiff's body after an operation and negligently failing 
to discover the object during the remaining period of treatment. See Thatcher v. De Tar, 
351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943). 
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duty to warn persons who had been exposed to the deleterious 
substance in defendant's product.47 However, these attempts have 
thus far been unsuccessful, although at least one court recognized 
some merit in the idea of creating a new common-law tort based 
on a continuing duty of a manufacturer to warn the public of 
harmful effects or need for treatment after exposure to damaging 
substances, once the manufacturer has some reason to believe that 
such exposure has occurred.48 This idea could readily be applied to 
a radiation incident, and a court might be willing to save a plain-
tiff's claim by imposing a duty on those who use radioactive mate-
rials to warn the public or specific individuals of possible damag-
ing exposures. In this way one whose radiation injury was induced 
by a single exposure might also be able to invoke the continuing 
tort doctrine. 
A variation of the theory of continuing negligence was applied 
in Wright v. Carter Prods.49 where plaintiff contracted dermatitis 
caused by a chemical compound used in a deodorant manufactured 
by defendant. Plaintiff had applied the product two or three times 
a week for five years, but then developed a slight rash. She discon-
tinued its use for five months, and the rash subsided; subsequently, 
a severe allergic reaction developed after only two applications. 
Suit was filed within the limitation period, if the period were 
calculated from the date of the last application. The court held 
that if the trier of fact should find that plaintiff's affliction was 
proximately caused by the last application, then her claim accrued 
at that time.r;o Thus, where an injury is the result of a series of 
exposures having a cumulative effect, the last few, or indeed the 
last exposure itself, may have been a necessary element in the 
causation of the ultimate damage. If plaintiff would have incurred 
no injury without the final contact or exposure, then clearly un-
der the theory of this case, the limitation should not start before 
that time. On the other hand, the earlier exposures will usually 
have contributed to the total damage, and it frequently would be 
impossible to prove the precise exposure which made some injury 
certain to occur and without which no harm would have resulted. · 
Therefore, the continuing tort theory alleviates a substantial proof 
problem in many factual situations. 
-t1 E.g., Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., 126 F. Supp. 690 (D. Conn. 1954); Schwartz v. 
Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 190 N.E.2d 253, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963). 
-ts Zimmerer v. General Elec. Co., supra note 47, at 693. 
-to 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957). 
ISO Id. at 63. 
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Because of the cumulative effect of exposure to radiation,51 
special problems may arise in those cases in which a plaintiff has 
been exposed a number of times. Four possible situations may 
occur: first, more than one person may have exposed the plaintiff, 
but all the exposures were needed for any injury to result; second, 
again having multiple defendants, each exposure was sufficient to 
cause some injury, and thus each defendant is merely a contribut-
ing tortfeasor; third, one person may have caused all the exposures, 
and the sum of the exposures was required to produce an injury; 
and, fourth, the single defendant may have exposed plaintiff each 
time to injury-inducing quantities of radiation. The latter two 
situations could be handled under the traditional continuing tort 
theory. However, the existence of multiple defendants will present 
novel questions in attempting to utilize the doctrine, and it seems 
unlikely that it would be applied in such circumstances. Certainly, 
both the first and second situations create additional problems in 
working out the substantive liability of each defendant if the 
limitation issue were to be settled in favor of the plaintiff. 52 
2. At the Time of Notice of Injury 
A significant trend in the judicial interpretation of limitations 
statutes appears to be developing in cases involving delayed mani-
festation diseases or injuries caused by wrongful conduct which 
was unknown to the plaintiff at the time of the technical invasion 
of his legal interests. In order to save meritorious claims from the 
statutory bar, courts have frequently been forced to formulate new 
theories and reasons to justify placing the start of the limitation 
period at some date subsequent to the time that plaintiff would 
probably have been able to sustain a cause of action (had he 
known of its existence). The underlying rationale which supports 
this rather recent development is that a person must have some 
notice of his cause of action, an awareness either that he has suf-
fered an injury or that another person has committed a legal wrong 
which ultimately may result in harm to him, before the statute 
can begin to run. 
The major impetus in this development came from the deci-
sion in Urie v. Thompson,53 wherein the Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the injurious conse-
51 See ATOMS AND THE LAW 23. 
52 For a detailed discussion of the general problem of multiple defendants in radia-
tion cases, see ATOMS AND THE LAw 361-421. 
53 337 U.S. 163 (1949). See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277 (1950). 
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quences of defendant's negligence became manifest. After working 
thirty years for the defendant railroad, in 1940 plaintiff became 
disabled from silicosis, a pulmonary disease caused by the pro-
longed inhalation of silica dust. Suit was filed in 1941, and the 
defendant pleaded the three-year limitation.54 Defendant proposed 
two alternative theories as to when the cause of action accrued: 
first, that Urie must have unwittingly contracted silicosis long 
before 1938, thus not within the limitation period before suit was 
filed; or, second, that each inhalation of silica dust was a separate 
tort, therefore recovery should be limited to the consequential 
damages resulting from inhalations between 1938 and 1940, when 
he stopped working. But the Court flatly rejected "such a mechan-
ical analysis of the 'accrual' of petitioner's injury."55 However, the 
Court avoided applying the theory of continuing negligence which 
would have accomplished the same favorable result for Urie. Of 
particular significance is the Court's reference to "the traditional 
purposes of statutes of limitations, which conventionally require 
the assertion of claims within a specified period of time after notice 
of the invasion of legal rights."56 The opinion emphasized the 
humane legislative plan upon which plaintiff's claim was based57 
and that defendant's theories would thwart the congressional pur-
pose. Furthermore, the Court quoted language from a California 
workmen's compensation case58 as authority for holding that the 
limitation period begins when the disease manifests itself. Clearly 
these two factors, the congressional plan for the protection of rail-
road employees, and the fact that a workmen's compensation deci-
sion was cited as authority, could make Urie v. Thompson dis-
tinguishable from a case involving a common-law tort claim or 
one in which an employment or confidential relationship was 
lacking. 
On the other hand, the principle that plaintiff must receive 
some notice of his cause of action before the statute of limitations 
starts running has been applied in the context of a common-law 
tort claim.59 Moreover, several courts have considered workmen's 
114 Plaintiff's claim was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which 
provides that an action shall be barred three years after it accrues. 35 Stat. 66 (1908), as 
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1954). 
1111 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949). 
ISfl Id. at 170. (Emphasis added.) 
117 Both the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 51-60 (1958), and the Boiler Inspection Act, 36 Stat. 913 (1911), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 
§§ 22-34 (1958), were involved in the present action. 
118 Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 12 P .2d 
1075 (1932). 
ISO See, e.g., City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954). 
766 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
compensation cases as applicable authority in interpreting limita-
tions provisions governing nonstatutory claims.60 In workmen's 
compensation cases courts frequently justify a liberal interpreta-
tion of accrual language because they feel that such statutes involve 
a "humane legislative scheme,"61 or in many instances because the 
statute creates a particular relationship which places a special duty 
on the defendant for plaintiff's protection.62 Often, compensation 
cases, such as Urie v. Thompson, are cited when courts resolve 
general tort litigation in which neither of these arguments is 
present. Considerations of fairness may also play an important 
role in the construction of limitations statutes. Admittedly, these 
statutes are supported by a strong public policy in favor of repose 
and fairness to potential defendants, but the countervailing con-
sideration of justice for plaintiffs who are blamelessly ignorant of 
their claims may overcome this policy.63 Courts often refer to the 
unreasonable, even absurd, result of holding that an action is 
barred before the plaintiff knew of his injury, or place emphasis on 
the fact that the right to recover for many serious but slowly 
developing diseases would be nullified if the statute ran before 
there was notice to the injured party of his claim.64 One additional 
reason which has been given for delaying the start of the limitation 
period is that the injurious consequences suffered by plaintiff were 
the product "of a period of time rather than a point of time," and, 
therefore, the afflicted party can be held to be injured only when 
the accumulated effects manifest themselves.65 
Although the underlying rationale of the theory under discus-
sion is that the element of notice to the plaintiff is essential to the 
accrual of a cause of action, the decisions vary as to what constitutes 
sufficient notice. Four possibilities are suggested by the language 
of the opinions. One idea, frequently appearing, is that the dam-
ages or injury must be susceptible of ascertainment.66 It would 
60 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955) (applying 
Nebraska law); Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936). 
61 See, e.g., Hutchison v. Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d 803 (1961). 
62 See, e.g., Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960) (applying 
Ohio law); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1954). 
63 See Fernandi v. Stmlly, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277 (1961). 
64 See, e.g., Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960) (applying 
Connecticut law); Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959). 
65 The quoted phrase originally appeared in Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial 
Acc. Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932). See Urie v. Thompson, 
337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797, 800 (1960); United 
States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1958). 
66 See, e.g., Gahimer v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp., 241 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1957); 
Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959). 
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seem that this is basically the approach taken in Urie v. Thompson, 
the idea being expressed there in terms of manifestation of the 
harmful effects of defendant'_s wrongful act. The connotation of 
manifestation is that the injury is ascertainable by observation or 
by some other means of human perception. Of course, there are 
varying degrees of manifestation, and the decisions do not discuss 
the problem of whether a disease, for example, is "ascertainable" 
when symptoms first appear or only after it can clearly be diag-
nosed as a particular disease. 
A second possibility as to when notice is sufficient is the mo-
ment that plaintiff actually discovers or knows that he has a 
particular disease or injury.67 Indeed, it has frequently been held 
that the limitation period did not commence until the plaintiff's 
illness was actually diagnosed by a physician.68 Although this stand-
ard of notice can be easily determined, it is susceptible to abuse 
by a plaintiff who is aware of symptoms foretelling his serious 
condition but who delays confirmation of his apprehension that he 
is suffering from a fatal disease. 
The third possible date when the action will accrue is usually 
mentioned as an alternative to the time when plaintiff knew of his 
injury or disease. This is when he should have known.69 This idea 
may also be phrased so as specifically to require reasonable dili-
gence on the part of the plaintiff to discover the nature of his ill-
ness.70 By permitting use of this alternative to actual knowledge of 
the plaintiff, courts preserve the inherent fairness of the concept of 
notice of a cause of action as a condition for accrual. 
As a fourth possibility for when the notice is sufficient, there 
is language in two California malpractice cases which suggests that 
the limitations statute may not start to run until plaintiff knows 
the specific cause of his disability.71 In both cases, however, the 
doctor-patient relationship continued long enough to support the 
decisions solely on the basis of a continuing negligence theory. 
67 See, e.g., McGhee v. Chesapeake &: O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959); Sea-
board Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956). 
68 Young v. Clinchfield R.R., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1961); Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, 
Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 
1955); Bradt v. United States, 221 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1955); Muse v. Freeman, 197 F. Supp. 
67 (E.D. Va. 1961). 
oo See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1956); Hutchison v. 
Semler, 227 Ore. 437, 361 P.2d 803 (1961). 
70 See Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960); Gulf Oil Corp. v. 
Alexander, 291 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). 
71 See Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); Trom-
bley v. Kolts, 29 Cal. App. 2d 699, 85 P.2d 541 (1938). 
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Nevertheless, in each opinion the holding was at least partially 
supported by the idea that notice of causal connection is a pre-
requisite for commencing the limitation period. Moreover, deci-
sions involving workmen's compensation claims which suggest that 
notice of the cause of plaintiff's injury is a condition of accrual72 
could provide analogous authority in a common-law tort claim. 78 
Even though courts have gone quite far to relieve innocent 
plaintiffs who were victims of slow-developing diseases, or delayed 
manifestation injuries, from the harsh result of a statutory bar, the 
problem of what will constitute sufficient notice of a cause of action 
remains unsettled. Of particular importance is the question of 
whether notice to a person that he was negligently exposed to 
radiation will immediately give rise to a cause of action. He has 
technically suffered an "injury" which, presumably, would entitle 
him to at least a nominal recovery. But unless future injury were 
"reasonably certain" to occur74 and such anticipated loss could be 
substantiated, the plaintiff would remain uncompensated for the 
actual serious damage which might develop subsequently. On the 
other hand, if limitations statutes were construed so as to com-
mence running only after the plaintiff has notice of his ultimate 
injury (even though he knew of the exposure), perhaps twenty or 
thirty years after exposure, potential defendants are placed at a 
considerable disadvantage. The plaintiff, knowing that he has been 
exposed to a specified dose of radiation by the defendant, can pre-
serve his evidence, await development of any serious consequences 
and then spring his claim on the defendant who will obviously be 
hard-pressed to defend adequately against a suit. Not only is there 
a danger of spurious claims being brought under these circum-
stances, but the fact that radiation-induced injuries are nonspecific 
also creates the distinct possibility of recoveries for injuries which 
were not caused by the defendant.75 The obvious inequities cast 
upon either plaintiffs or defendants, depending upon which con-
cept of notice is adopted, suggest the stark inadequacy of existing 
principles of interpretation of the accrual of a cause of action. 
72 See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Porter, 192 Md. 494, 64 A.2d 715 (1948); White-
head v. Holston Defense Corp., 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959). 
73 The First Circuit looked to Nebraska workmen's compensation cases to decide how 
the Nebraska courts would construe a limitation in a common•law tort action. Sylvania 
Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955). But cf. Repass v. Keleket X-ray Corp., 
212 F. Supp. 406 (D.N.J. 1962). 
74 For a detailed discussion of problems of proving future damages, see ATOMS AND 
TIIE LAw 465-94. See also Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New 
Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 275 (1960). 
75 See Estep, supra note 74, at 268. 
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The problems are perhaps more complex and thus more likely 
to defy equitable solution when the radiation victim receives no 
immediate notice of the exposure. If he develops, for example, 
sterility, cancer, or leukemia several years hence, would this be 
notice that he had been exposed to radiation at an earlier date, 
and by whom? These are not difficulties raised solely by limita-
tion provisions, but at least in part by the nature of the injuries. 
Providing that a plaintiff could meet minimal proof standards as 
to a particular defendant's liability for his injuries, it would appear 
that some courts would hold that the cause of action did not accrue 
until plaintiff at least knew, or should have known, of his injury, 
and even perhaps not until he knew its causal connection with 
defendant's radiation source. Even this could be known only in a 
statistical sense because each of these diseases occurs in a certain 
percent of the population without any known cause and certainly 
without exposure to more than background radiation. Therefore, 
it does not seem unlikely that a court which is not bound to follow 
the notice theory of accrual might consider the difficult proof prob-
lems that it would be required to resolve and avoid such problems 
by holding the action barred by the statute of limitations. 
B. Suspension of the Limitation Period 
Apart from considerations of whether or not a cause of action 
has accrued, other circumstances may prevent commencement of 
litigation despite the existence of a cognizable claim.76 Legislatures 
and courts have recognized certain conditions as grounds for post-
ponement of the start of the limitation period or interruption of 
the running of the sta~ute. These conditions are categorized in 
terms of plaintiff's incapacity to bring an action, conduct of defend-
ant which hinders suit, and special circumstances in which an 
action has failed or is otherwise prevented. Many of the tolling 
provisions are common throughout the country with only slight 
variations from state to state, while other enactments are peculiar 
to one or two jurisdictions. 
1. Plaintiff's Incapacity 
Legal disabilities such as infancy, insanity, and imprisonment 
are generally recognized in limitation statutes as bases for post-
ponement. The legislative provisions may include claimants hav-
76 See generally Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 
1177, 1220-37 (1950). 
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ing "any legal disability"77 or specify particular disabilities to be 
protected.78 Frequently a maximum period is set for which the 
limitation can be tolled,79 or, on the other hand, a single limita-
tion period may be applicable, regardless of the type of claim, 
after the disability is removed. 80 Otherwise, the statute will be 
tolled throughout the period of disability and the limitation nor-
mally governing the particular cause involved will start running 
when the plaintiff acquires the capacity to sue. In Delaware and 
Pennsylvania, however, limitations applicable to personal injury 
actions are not affected by disabilities.81 One further qualification, 
generally recognized, is that the plaintiff's infirmity must exist 
when the cause of action accrues and will not suspend the statute 
once it has commenced running.82 
Although the above-mentioned tolling provision will not be 
generally significant in coping with the special problems arising 
in radiation cases, it could be utilized advantageously in particular 
circumstances. If recovery were to be allowed to children, de-
formed as a consequence of the genetic damage suffered by a 
parent who had been irradiated, 83 the cause of action might be 
tolled during his minority, providing no special limitation statute 
is enacted to accommodate such new principles of liability. More-
over, radiation injuries suffered by a viable foetus might not be-
come manifest during early childhood, and this particular tolling 
statute would be especially relevant. Obviously, any person who is 
under a legal disability at the time of exposure may benefit from 
the additional time allowed by a suspension of the usual limita-
tion period. There are other circumstances concerning a plaintiff's 
capacity to sue which are commonly recognized as grounds for 
tolling a limitation, but they have no particular relevance to radia-
tion injuries.84 
77 E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-307 (1949). 
78 E.g., ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956). 
79 E.g., MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 93-2703 (1947) (cannot extend period more than five 
years except for infancy). 
so E.g., N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 508:8 (1955) (within two years after the disability is 
removed). 
81 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8115 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 35 (1953) (as con-
strued in Peterson v. Delaware River Ferry Co., 190 Pa. 364, 42 Atl. 955 (1899)). 
82 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1229. 
83 See Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for Genetic Injuries From Radiation, 24 LA. 
L. REv. 1 (1963). 
84 State legislatures have generally provided for the suspension of limitations statutes 
during the interim between the claimholder's death and the appointment of a personal 
representative, if decedent's action was not already barred. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-803 
(1935). An extension may be granted if death occurred within thirty days after the ex-
piration of the limitation period. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.610 (1935). Usually the rep• 
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2. Defendant's Conduct 
Perhaps the most common tolling provision in existence today 
is that which excludes from the limitation period the time that 
defendant is absent from the state in which plaintiff resides. Typi-
cally, if the defendant is absent when the cause accrues, the statute 
of limitations will not begin running until he returns; also, the 
limitation is tolled if the defendant departs after the claim arises, 
although a specified minimum period of absence may be re-
quired. 85 About one-fourth of the states suspend the period only 
when the defendant leaves to take up residence in another jurisdic-
tion. 86 Moreover, application of the tolling statute in a particular 
state may be circumscribed by certain limitations-that the plain-
tiff be a resident,87 that the cause have arisen within the state,88 or 
that suit be brought within a maximum tolling period.89 Obviously, 
the policy underlying this tolling provision is to protect the plain-
tiff who is unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 
Therefore, it seems illogical to regard the defendant as "absent" if 
a means of substituted service is available. 
Although the source of injurious radiation frequently will be 
stationary and thus usually affect only persons in the vicinity of 
defendant's nuclear operations, in a significant number of cases 
persons and property outside the state of defendant's place of busi-
ness or incorporation might be irradiated. Illustratively, an acci-
dent during shipment of radioactive materials or the improper 
disposal of waste products affecting land several miles downstream 
could create a cause of action in another state where the injurious 
impact occurred. Therefore, unless the defendant acquired suf-
ficient contacts so as not to be "absent" from the state where injury 
occurred, the limitation apparently would be tolled, and an in-
jured party would be able to assert his claim several years after the 
statute would otherwise have run. However, to take advantage 
of the tolling provision, suit usually would have to be filed in the 
resentative must bring the action within one year after death, assuming that the statute 
of limitations otherwise applicable to decedent's claim would have run before that time. 
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 20 (Smith-Hurd 1962). If the cause of action accrues after 
the plaintiff's death, the start of the limitation period is generally held to be postponed 
until a representative is appointed. See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1233. 
For a decision holding that decedent's claim for personal injury did not arise until after 
death, sec McGhec v. Chesapeake 8e O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959). 
85 Sec Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1224-25. 
86 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.200 (1949). 
87 E.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-1-18 (1956). 
88 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 40 (1953). 
so E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-590 (1960) (seven years). 
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state where the action arose,90 and plaintiff might not be able to 
acquire jurisdiction over the absent defendant. Thus, such a toll-
ing provision may have only a limited effect on statutes of limita-
tions in radiation cases. State legislatures also have enacted pro-
visions to suspend the limitation period upon a defendant's demise, 
usually extending the time for bringing suit to one year after the 
appointment of a representative.91 But this will have little rele-
vance in radiation incidents, assuming that the potential defendant 
usually will be a corporation. A claim against a dissolved and liq-
uidated corporation would have little, if any, value.92 
Although statutes of limitations are some evidence of a legis-
lative judgment as to the capability of courts to decide old claims, 
their primary purpose is the protection of defendants from the 
harassment and surprise of having to defend against stale claims. 
Consequently, the statute of limitations is usually regarded as a 
personal defense and frequently must be specifically pleaded by 
the defendant.93 If the defendant has promised not to plead the 
statute, courts will enforce the agreement in most circumstances 
under usual contract principles. However, a waiver may be un-
enforceable if it was made before, rather than after, liability arose 
or if it is of indefinite duration rather than for a definite period 
of time.94 In addition, even though defendant's conduct does not 
constitute a waiver, i.e., acts only resembling a promise, it may 
be sufficient for the application of principles of estoppel.95 Where 
defendant's fraud or misrepresentations have induced plaintiff to 
forbear prosecution of a known claim, and the limitation period 
expired during the period of forbearance, the defendant generally 
is estopped from relying on the statutory bar.96 Moreover, courts 
may employ an equitable estoppel to defeat the statutory bar in 
90 Since limitation provisions are generally characterized as procedural in the conflict 
of laws, a forum would apply its own tolling statute; therefore, in any state in which 
defendant had resided during the limitation period the action would be barred, See 
part D infra. · 
91 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.310 (1960). However, Hawaii has expressly provided that 
the defendant's death does not interrupt the running of the statute of limitations. 
HAWAII REv. LAws § 241-16 (1955). In a few other states no provision to postpone the 
statutory bar in this situation has been included among the other tolling sections. E.g., 
Colorado, Kansas, and Ohio. 
92 See LATIIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 12, § 11 (1959). 
93 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
94 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1223-24. 
95 See generally Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34 MICH. L. REV. I (1935). 
96 E.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959), 12 W. REs. L. REV. 
122 (1960). Although Glus was an FELA case, there is usually an exception to the general 
rule where the limitation is "substantive," i.e., enacted in conjunction with a statute 
creating a cause of action. Id. at 123. 
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circumstances involving plaintiff's reasonable reliance on any con-
duct of a misleading nature.97 
If a major nuclear incident were to occur, the responsible party 
might be willing to promise to waive the defense of a limitation 
bar in consideration for promises from those who were exposed 
that they would not file suit until a radiation-induced injury mani-
fested itself.98 The inducement on defendant's part would be the 
avoidance of having to defend immediately a large number of 
cases and the certain prospect of a few high recoveries for specu-
lative damages which juries are likely to award. On the other 
hand, the potential plaintiffs would have a strong motive to enter 
such an agreement because of the substantial proof problems they 
must face in trying to establish future injuries which are "reason-
ably certain" to develop.99 Furthermore, assuming that extensive 
settlement negotiations would arise out of an incident of any mag-
nitude, plaintiffs might succeed in estopping a plea of limitations 
if defendant's conduct during such negotiations was of a character 
that misled plaintiffs. 
Defendant's fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause 
of action is commonly recognized by both the judiciary and legis-
latures as a justifiable basis for postponement of the limitation 
period.100 Whether the rationale is expressed in terms of defend-
ant's conduct estopping him from pleading the statute, the acts of 
fraudulent concealment constituting a basis for tolling the limi-
tation, or defendant's activity amounting to a fraud which gives 
rise to an independent cause of action, the same result will be 
achieved, because the damage in a suit for fraud presumably would 
be the value of the claim that was barred. The principal problems 
facing the courts are what conduct constitutes fraudulent conceal-
ment and what facts must be concealed in order to invoke this 
exception. 
Generally, the acts of concealment must comprise active mis-
representation or conduct rather than silence or inaction, unless 
97 E.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 1115 Mass. 366, 52 N.E.2d 968 (1944) (assurances that the 
claim would be satisfied without suit); McLeam v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617 
(1931) (request by defendant that plaintiff delay filing a complaint). 
llS However, if such an agreement would not be enforceable because it was of an 
indefinite duration (see text accompanying note 94 supra), the parties could set a maxi-
mum period of twenty-five or thirty years during which defendant would not plead the 
statute as a defense to an action arising out of this particular incident. 
oo See authorities cited note 74 supra. 
100 See, e.g., Mn. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 14 (1957); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 
(La. App. 1934). See generally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limita-
tion, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875 (1933). 
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there exists a relationship of a fiduciary nature or a statutory duty 
to disclose.101 Whether defendant intended to conceal or merely 
made innocent misrepresentations should not be determinative, 
since the effect on plaintiff's claim will be the same in either situ-
ation. Moreover, where a confidential relationship exists, as be-
tween doctor and patient, a duty affirmatively to disclose wrongful 
conduct is frequently implied where defendant allegedly knew of 
the negligent act,1°2 and occasionally has been imposed where he 
did not know.103 In addition, it has been held that a defendant 
who voluntarily undertook to treat the plaintiff for injuries suf-
fered as a result of its negligence, had a duty placed upon it to 
disclose fully the extent of his injuries and the probable future 
disability to be expected. In this case, however, defendant's agents 
had also actively misrepresented plaintiff's condition to him.104 
Precisely what facts need to be concealed to prevent the statute 
of limitations from running remains unsettled. If the defendant 
has caused plaintiff's injury and, by active concealment of facts 
which otherwise would have come to plaintiff's attention, success-
fully prevents him from learning that he is injured, clearly the 
limitation period should be postponed.105 On the other hand, 
where the defendant merely fails to diagnose accurately a pre-exist-
ing injury or illness without intending to mislead or hinder in-
quiry, the cause of action-for failing to disclose the fact of injury 
-has not been concealed.106 In one case, although the plaintiff 
had notice that he was suffering some ill effects from radiation 
treatments, the defendant's representations that no injurious results 
would follow were held to be a sufficient ground for tolling the 
statute, providing the plaintiff could not have discovered the facts 
with reasonable diligence.107 However, absent a confidential rela-
tionship it seems unlikely that the defendant very often would 
have more information than the plaintiff about the extent and 
101 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1221; Annot., 173 A.L.R. 576, 585 
(1948). An example of a statutory duty to disclose would be the obligation of a motorist 
to stop and give his name to the other party, and even offer assistance in case of physical 
injury, whenever he is involved in a collision. 
102 E.g., Saffold v. Scarborough, 91 Ga. App. 628, 86 S.E.2d 649 (1955); Hinkle v. Har• 
gens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957). But see Buchanan v. Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 
N.W.2d 351 (1949). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 400-14 (1961). 
103 E.g., Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948); Rosane v. Senger, 112 
Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944). 
104 Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944). 
105 See Developments in the Law, supra note 76, at 1221. 
106 Eschenbacher v. Hier, 363 Mich. 676, 110 N.W .2d 731 (1961). 
101 Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932). But see Ogg v. Robb, 
181 Iowa 145, 162 N.W. 217 (1917). 
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nature of the latter's injuries, unless, of course, defendant knew 
that it had negligently exposed plaintiff to a damaging quantity 
of a deleterious substance, e.g., nuclear radiation. One further ele-
ment necessary for the prosecution of a claim is the identity of the 
wrongdoer, and, although it may seem contrary to our adversary 
system, there are circumstances in which the defendant's failure 
to identify himself to the plaintiff constitutes conduct so improper 
that the limitation will be postponed.108 
In one of the early cases involving a claim for radiation in-
juries, La Porte v. United States Radium Corp.,1°0 the plaintiff 
filed a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant from asserting the 
statute of limitations as a defense on grounds of fraudulent con-
cealment. The bill was dismissed because the court found that 
there was not sufficient knowledge or reason to believe that a haz-
ard existed at the time the injury was incurred or even during 
the limitation period. Thus, the defendant could not have been 
under a duty to disclose a hazard of which it could not have been 
aware. Even today the state of knowledge regarding the amount 
of radiation which will cause some physical harm is uncertain; 
indeed, there are many conflicting theories regarding all of the 
possible effects of radioactivity on human cells. Moreover, the La 
Porte reasoning could be applied to a circumstance in which the 
defendant had no knowledge, or reason to know, that it had ex-
posed a particular individual. As the law now stands, therefore, 
it would seem that an allegation of fraudulent concealment based 
solely on a failure to notify of radiation exposure will seldom be 
successful, absent a confidential relationship. 
3. Special Circumstances 
When a timely suit is prevented or stayed by a legislative act 
or an injunction, the statute of limitations usually is tolled,11° 
Moreover, the plaintiff is frequently granted additional time to 
file a new action where his suit has failed-for example, because 
the action was instituted against the wrong party111--or where 
judgment was reversed, other than on the merits.112 
108 E.g., Kurry v. Frost, 204 Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48 (1942) (defendant did not disclose 
that she, rather than her husband, was the hit-and-run driver who injured plaintiff). 
100 13 F. Supp. 263 (D.N.J. 1935). 
110 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24 (Smith-Hurd 1956); S.C. CODE § 10-llO (1962). 
111 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 52-593 (1960). 
112 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 35 (1958); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 205. Less common, but 
appearing in a significant number of statutes, is a provision suspending the limitation 
applicable to a claim held by or against an alien, subject or citizen of any country at war 
with the United States. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.608 (1935). 
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Arkansas has enacted a unique statute permitting a party to 
preserve a cause of action against an unknown tortfeasor by filing 
a complaint within the limitation period against John Doe.113 In 
contrast to other tolling provisions, the pl_ainti:ff is here required 
to undertake certain formal steps, i.e., file a complaint and an affi-
davit that the true defendant's identity is unknown, rather than 
merely being allowed to acquire the benefits of suspension of the 
limitation because of his own incapacity or the defendant's con-
duct. Such a provision is especially relevant to radiation cases in 
which the injured party is aware that he was overexposed but is 
uncertain as to the party responsible. Even in a situation in which 
a person first has notice of a possible radiation injury when there 
is a physical manifestation such as cancer or leukemia, he might 
be permitted to bring a John Doe action to preserve his claim 
until the actual defendant can be determined, providing, however, 
that the court would say that his cause of action did not accrue 
until he received some notice of his claim. 
C. When a Wrongful Death Action Is Barred 
Although at common law a right of action could not be 
founded upon the death of a person, and the death of either party 
terminated liability for personal torts, in all American jurisdic-
tions statutes have been enacted to rectify both situations.114 "Sur-
vival acts" make it possible to maintain or continue a tort action 
after the death of either the plaintiff or defendant, 115 while "death 
acts" permit recovery for damages sustained as a result of the de-
cedent's death. Most of the states have adopted "death acts" mod-
eled after England's Fatal Accident Act,116 commonly referred to 
as Lord Campbell's Act. There are three distinguishing features 
in this type of statute: it creates a right of action for death caused 
by a wrongful act, neglect or default, which, if death had not en-
sued, would have entitled the decedent to maintain an action and 
recover damages; the action is for the exclusive benefit of speci-
fied persons, usually limited to the immediate family of the de-
ceased; and the damages recoverable are such as result to the bene-
ficiaries from the death.111 Although otherwise similar to Lord 
113 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-234-36 (1962). 
114 See PROSSER, TORTS 705 (2d ed. 1955). 
115 See generally Evans, A Comparative Study of the Statutory Survival of Tort Claims 
For and Against Executors and Administrators, 29 MICH. L. REv. 969 (1931}; Note, 48 
HARV. L. REv. 1008 (1935). 
116 9 &: IO Viet., c. 93 (1846). 
117 TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL Acr § 22 (2d ed. 1913). The state statutes may 
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Campbell's Act, a few state statutes create a cause of action in favor 
of the decedent's estate or have been construed as allowing an ac-
tion to be maintained notwithstanding the nonexistence of the 
persons for whose benefit the action is primarily given.118 A third 
type of "death act" is clearly distinguishable since it merely author-
izes the survival of the claim which decedent could have main-
tained, enlarging it to include the damages sustained by his estate 
as a result of his death, rather than creating a new cause of action 
for the damages suffered as a consequence of decedent's passing.119 
Nuclear radiation not only causes physical injury, such as can-
cer, but it also shortens the normal life expectancy of persons who 
are overexposed.120 Even if a decedent had never suffered an ill-
ness directly attributable to radiation, his family may be able to 
recover their loss resulting from his early death. Of course, al-
though the decedent suffered a radiation-induced injury, he may 
have been unable to recover because his action was barred. There-
fore, it is imperative to examine two limitation problems which 
may be particularly relevant in radiation cases; when does the stat-
ute of limitations for a wrongful death action begin to run, and 
what is the effect on such an action if decedent's claim was time-
barred. 
1. Commencement of the Limitation Period 
Generally, a special statute of limitations governs wrongful 
death actions. Although each case will be determined on the basis 
of the particular language of the applicable limitation provision, 
the great weight of judicial authority holds that the statutory pe-
riod begins at the time of death.121 This result is usually reached 
whether the limitation statute requires that suit be filed within 
a specified period (without mention of any point of time from 
which the period is to be computed), from the date the cause of 
action "accrued," or within a specified time after death.122 How-
vary in the following respects: (1) the members of the family for whose benefit an action 
may be brought, (2) the person in whose name it may be brought (Lord Campbell's Act 
designated the decedent's personal representative as the proper party), (3) the time within 
which an action must be filed, (4) the manner of distributing the recovery, and (5) the 
measure of damages, i.e., limitations on recovery. Id. § 24. 
118 See id. § 25. 
110 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (1960); see Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 
Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). 
120 See ATOMS AND THE LAw 270. 
121 See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 815, 817 (1947). 
122 E.g., St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 31 So. 2d 710 (1947) (within 
specified time); Western &: A.R.R. v. Bass, 104 Ga. 390, 30 S.E. 874 (1898) (from date of 
"accrual'); Naticchioni v. Felter, 54 Ohio App. 180, 6 N.E.2d 764 (1936) (after death). 
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ever, if the applicable "death act" is of the type which merely 
enlarges the decedent's claim to include damages for death, the 
limitation period would logically start at the time decedent was 
injured, i.e., when his cause of action for personal injuries ac-
crued.123 Limitation provisions specifically governing only a wrong-
ful death action are usually not tolled by circumstances which 
would suspend general statutes of limitations.124 
The limitation period for bringing a wrongful death action 
will not create any unique problems in radiation cases so long as 
those for whose benefit the right of action is given know that the 
decedent was irradiated and can thus press their claim against a 
known defendant. When the actual cause of death is unknown, 
however, the relatively short statutory period, usually one or two 
years, will probably preclude recovery for a defendant's wrongful 
overexposure of the decedent. There is no authority for the prop-
osition that a limitation governing an action to recover for death 
will start to run only after the cause of death is determined.125 
The more significant question is what effect the fact that decedent's 
claim for personal injuries was barred will have upon the new 
cause of action in favor of his beneficiaries. 
2. Effect of Decedent's Action Being Barred 
There is general agreement that most defenses which would 
have barred the decedent's claim for personal injuries will defeat 
an action founded on his death resulting from those injuries.126 
Although the opposite conclusion might have been expected, since 
"death acts" typically create a new cause of action for the benefit 
of designated survivors, the prevailing view is usually supported 
on the theory that a right is created only in the event that defend-
ant's wrongful conduct would have entitled the decedent to main-
tain an action if death had not ensued.127 Even a prior judgment 
in a suit by the decedent for his personal injuries or a release of 
his claim will generally operate as a bar to a later wrongful death 
action.128 On the other hand, several courts have held that a wrong-
123 E.g., Gardner v. Beck, 195 Iowa 62, 189 N.W. 962 (1922). But see Thompson v. 
New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 805, 83 So. 19 (1919). 
124 E.g., Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958). See generally 35 N.D.L. REv. 
171 (1959). 
125 But cf. McGhee v. Chesapeake&: O.R.R., 173 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1959) (de-
cedent's claim for personal injuries did not accrue until there was reason to discover 
that he had an occupational disease, which was not until the autopsy). 
126 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 114, at 716-18. 
127 See text accompanying note 117 supra. 
128 E.g., Perry's Adm'x v. Louisville&: N.R.R., 199 Ky. 396, 251 S.W. 202 (1923) (judg-
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ful death action can still be maintained even though the limitation 
had run against decedent's claim while he was living.129 
In support of the conclusion that decedent's action being 
barred has no effect on a suit for his death, the principal argu-
ment frequently focuses upon the independent nature of the wrong-
ful death action. The qualifying statutory language to the effect 
that decedent must have been able to maintain an action if death 
had not ensued, merely relates to the nature of the defendant's 
conduct; he must have committed an actionable tort. As further 
proof of the independence of the wrongful death action, emphasis 
is occasionally placed on the difference in the measure of damages 
between decedent's claim for personal injuries and the survivors' 
damages resulting from his death.130 In the former, the person 
injured sues for physical harm, mental suffering, and impairment 
of earning power up to the time of trial and in the future; the 
latter action compensates the beneficiaries of his estate for the de-
struction of his ability to earn income with which to support them 
subsequent to the time of death. Furthermore, reliance may be 
placed upon the fact that death is a necessary condition for the 
accrual of this right of action, and therefore suit should not be 
barred before the claim arises.131 Cases holding that an earlier 
judgment for or against the deceased or a release of his claim bars 
a subsequent wrongful death action are usually distinguished on 
the ground that either of those events extinguishes the cause of ac-
tion, while statutes of limitations are considered as only barring 
the remedy and as not affecting the right.132 When the statutory 
language suggests that the action is for the death, rather than for 
the tort causing the death, additional support is given to the view 
that a limitations bar against decedent's action does not defeat the 
claim for the benefit of the designated survivors.133 However, those 
courts refusing to entertain suits founded on the death if dece-
dent's action had been barred frequently emphasize the statutory 
requirement that the decedent must have been able to maintain an 
ment for decedent); Libera v. Whitaker, Clark & Daniels, 20 N.J. Super. 292, 89 A.2d 734 
(Essex County Ct. 1952) (release). But see De Hart, Adm'r v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio 
App. 62, 85 N.E.2d 586 (1948) (dictum). 
120 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note ll4, at 718, where it is said that a majority of 
courts so hold. See generally 42 !LL. L. REv. 688 (1947); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 894 (1947). 
130 E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Simrall's Adm'r, 127 Ky. 55, 104 S.W. 1011 (1907). 
131 E.g., Wilson v. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke, 48 Ind. App. 150, 95 N.E. 589 (1911). 
132 E.g., Childers v. Eagle Picher Lead Co., 35 F. Supp. 702 (W .D. Mo. 1940); see 2 
HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1297 (1956). 
133 E.g., Parker v. Fies & Sons, 243 Ala. 348, IO So. 2d 13 (1942); see Annot., 167 
A.L.R. 894, 906 (1947). 
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action if death had not ensued.184 Clearly, the deceased could not 
have sustained his claim if the statute of limitations had run. Occa-
sionally the argument is advanced that the wrongful death action 
is "derivative," and therefore dependent upon the continued exis-
tence of a right of action in the injured party.135 This argument 
would seem to be especially persuasive in those situations in which 
the decedent's cause of action was statutorily created and the limi-
tation provision specifically governed the right, for such a limita-
tion is usually considered to be a condition which extinguishes the 
right rather than merely bars the remedy. In addition, reliance 
may be placed upon decisions in which a wrongful death action 
was barred because decedent's claim was not maintainable on the 
merits or had been released. It may be argued that these defenses 
to decedent's claim are indistinguishable from the statute of limi-
tations, since any of them would have to have been affirmatively 
pleaded by the defendant.136 Furthermore, if the survivors are 
allowed to prosecute a claim for defendant's wrongful conduct in 
the distant past, there is judicial concern about undermining the 
policies behind limitations statutes.137 Finally, it seems apparent 
that if the "death act" upon which the claim is based merely en-
larges the decedent's cause of action, the claim for death will be 
?a?'e~ when the limitation has run on the action for personal 
mJunes. 
In those jurisdictions in which a statutory bar of decedent's 
claim will not preclude the survivors' action for his death, defend-
ants will be less likely to escape all liability for radiation injuries. 
Although the radiation victim will not benefit directly, such an 
approach will alleviate some of the harsh effects resulting from 
the usual interpretation of the accrual of an action for delayed-
manifestation injuries. At least the survivors, who probably will 
have also suffered the impact of the expensive care for illnesses 
such as cancer or leukemia, will obtain some recompense for loss 
of income from the decedent's early death. But in states in which 
the decedent's claim must have been maintainable in order to 
sustain an action for the death, the beneficiaries must bear the 
entire financial burden of both a costly injury and the loss of in-
come after death, while the person whose wrongful conduct caused 
the decedent to be irradiated is free from any legally enforceable 
134 E.g., Piukkula v. Pillsbury Astoria Flouring Mills, 150 Ore. 304, 42 P .2d 921 (1935); 
Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946). 
135 E.g., Flynn v. N.Y., N.H. &: H.R.R., 283 U.S. 53 (1931); see 2 HAlu>ER &: JAMES, 
op. cit. supra note 132, at 1297. 
136 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c). 
137 See 42 ILL. L. REV. 688, 690-91 (1947). 
1964] RADIATION INJURIES 781 
liability. This consequence cannot be fairly rationalized by saying 
that there are always a few hard cases when certainty is sought, for 
virtually all radiation cases will create hardship for plaintiffs under 
most existing statutes of limitations. 
D. Which Limitation Governs 
In selecting the applicable limitation provision, problems of 
choice of the appropriate statute may arise in three different con-
texts. First, if the cause of action arose in a jurisdiction other than 
the forum, selection of the applicable statute will be governed by 
conflict of laws principles. The choice of law in this context is 
usually decided on the basis of whether the statute of limitations 
is to be characterized as procedural or substantive. Secondly, since 
no jurisdiction has only one limitation period for all actions, after 
the decision has been made as to which state's law shall control, 
the applicable limitation provision in that state must be deter-
mined. Generally, the choice in this context will be governed by 
the characterization of the plaintiff's claim, either in terms of the 
nature of the injury or the common-law form of action. Finally, 
when an action is brought in federal district court, with jurisdic-
tion based on diversity of citizenship, the problem to be resolved 
is whether federal or state law should control, including the 
question of which conflicts rules are to be applied. Again, as in the 
first context, the choice is now governed by characterizing the 
statute of limitations as either procedural or substantive. How-
ever, a limitation statute is usually characterized as procedural in 
the former and as substantive in the latter context. 
Undoubtedly, questions regarding the applicable limitation 
statute will frequently arise in radiation cases. Accidents during 
shipment of radioactive materials or improper disposal of waste 
products would very likely involve parties from different states. 
Moreover, the increased mpbility of the population will probably 
result in numerous instances of injured persons having moved to 
another state between the time they were exposed and when they 
first experience any significant injuries. Thus, it seems especially 
appropriate to examine existing choice of law principles in each 
of the above-mentioned contexts, since they are likely to be rele-
vant in many radiation damage suits. 
1. Characterization for the Con-ftict of Laws 
If suit is barred by the forum's statute of limitations, an action 
generally cannot be maintained even though it could still be 
782 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
brought in the state in which the right accrued.188 Conversely, an 
action may be maintainable in the forum although it is barred 
where the cause of action arose.139 This "forum rule" stems from 
the theory that general statutes of limitations, affecting only the 
remedy and not the right, are procedural rather than rules of 
substance. Moreover, they reflect a determination by the forum's 
legislature as to the period of time, following the occurrence of 
the events giving rise to a plaintiff's claim, after which its courts 
no longer can operate effectively and render a fair judgment.Ho 
The lex fori also determines when the cause of action accrued,m 
which of the forum's statutes is applicable142 and whether the 
limitation period was tolled.143 
Exceptions to this "forum rule" have been created by both 
courts and legislatures. Limitations which bar a specific statutory 
claim, especially one not recognized at common law, are usually 
construed as extinguishing the right rather than merely barring 
the remedy.144 Therefore, a forum will not entertain such a foreign 
cause of action which is barred by the lex loci, even though the 
forum's legislature has created a similar right which would not be 
barred, because the foreign limitation is deemed to be substantive 
and thus an integral part of the right itself.145 Of course, interpreta-
tive problems may arise in attempting to determine whether the 
foreign limitation is actually a condition of the right.146 
However, when the situation is reversed, i.e., when the statu-
tory claim would be barred by the forum's statute of limitations 
138 REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 603 (1934). See generally 3 BEALE, CONFLICT OF 
LAws § 604.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws § 85 (3d ed. 1949); HANCOCK, TORTS IN 
THE CONFLICT OF LAws 133-37 (1942); Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 
31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 474 (1933); Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of 
Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 492 (1919). 
139 REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 604. 
140 See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1177, 
1260 (1950). 
141 E.g., Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford ed., 131 Conn. 665, 42 A.2d 145 (1945). 
142 E.g., Alropa Corp. v. Rossee, 86 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1936). 
143 E.g., Western Coal &: Mining Co. v. Hilvert, 63 Ariz. 171, 160 P.2d 331 (1945). 
144 E.g., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
145 See REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 605; Developments in the Law, supra 
note 140, at 1261. 
146 In Boumias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955), the court 
discussed various tests which have been applied in deciding whether the foreign limita-
tion is procedural or substantive. Illustratively, if the limitation provision is directed 
to the statutory claim so specifically as to warrant concluding that it qualifies the right, 
then the foreign statute will be regarded as substantive. See Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 
(1904). See also Maki v. George R. Cooke Co., 124 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1942), where the 
"specificity" test was found to be satisfied by a separate statute limiting all statutory 
rights. Cf. Myers v. Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P.2d 885 (1954). 
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but not by the lex loci, the decisions are split.147 If the lex fori is 
applied in these circumstances, the result is often supported on 
the grounds that a foreign statutory claim should not be treated 
more favorably than a common-law right, and that the forum's 
policy has been established by the legislature and should be fol-
lowed in adjudicating such statutory claims, whether foreign or 
local.148 On the other hand, when a court applies the longer foreign 
limitation, it frequently emphasizes that comity should prevail 
over local policy in these circumstances. In addition, it has been 
suggested that the forum's legislature, in creating a similar statu-
tory right, intended that the forum limitation should govern only 
local actions and should not be applied to like claims arising in 
another state.149 If state legislatures decide to enact special legisla-
tion establishing grounds for liability for exposing third persons to 
radiation, and a new limitation period is adopted to apply to such 
a statutory cause of action, the decision as to which state's statute 
of limitations will apply could be decisive in a given case. Un-
doubtedly there will be significant differences in the time periods 
finally enacted once legislatures do attempt some resolution of the 
complex problems arising from widespread commercial use of 
radioactive materials.150 
The general "forum rule" has also been substantially modified 
in at least forty states by legislation which is commonly referred 
to as "borrowing" statutes.151 If the forum's limitation has not run 
on a foreign claim,152 then the "borrowing" provision directs the 
courts to look to some foreign law, usually either the lex loci or 
147 Compare Zellmer v. Acme Brewing Co., 184 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1950), with Theroux 
v. Northern Pac. R.R., 64 F. 84 (8th Cir. 1894). See generally STOMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF 
CoNFUcr OF L\ws 144-45 (1937); R.EsrATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 138, § 397, comment b; 
Annot., 68 A.L.R. 217 (1930). 
148 The full faith and credit clause (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I) does not require the 
forum to apply the longer foreign limitation, even though it applies specifically to the 
statutory right. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). 
140 See HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 138, at 134-35. 
150 A Model Nuclear Facilities Liability Act, including a statute of limitations pro• 
vision, has been adopted by the Conference on Uniform State Laws. See NAT'L CONFER· 
ENCE OF Cor.m'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 228 (1961). 
151 E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. IO, § 8120 (1953). For a recent discussion of these statutes, 
see Comment, 47 VA. L. REv. 299 (1961). Enactment of "borrowing" statutes was prompted 
by the decreased frequency with which the bar of the forum's limitation could be in-
voked because of the practically universal (all but Louisiana) existence of tolling P,rovi-
sions suspending the operation of statutes of limitations during the nonresidence or, in 
a few jurisdictions, even the temporary absence of the defendant. Note, Legislation Gov-
erning the Applicability of Foreign Statutes of Limitation, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 762, 762-64 
(1935). 
152 With the exception of Kentucky, the "borrowing" provisions a:re applied only 
when the forum statute has not run; otherwise the foreign legislation is disregarded and 
the general lex fori rule is applied. Annot., 75 A.L.R. 203, 231 (1931). 
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that of the residence of one or both of the parties,153 to determine 
whether or not the action would have been barred if brought 
there. In applying the foreign statute, the decisions of that sister 
state will be followed in deciding, for example, when the right of 
action accrued, whether the action was tolled, and which of the 
foreign statutes is applicable.154 Both the judicial exception for 
foreign statutory claims and the widespread enactment of "borrow-
ing" statutes have significantly affected the impact of the "forum 
rule" and consequently reduced the incentive for plaintiffs to 
forum-shop when their claims are stale and would be barred by 
the lex loci. Thus, even though a party suffering a radiation-
induced injury may find a forum in which the defendant can be 
served with process, and analogous judicial authority which sup-
ports the argument that his action did not accrue until he knew of 
his injury,165 he may be defeated by the limitation where the claim 
arose. In effect, whenever multiple jurisdictions have a contact 
with the parties and the cause of action, the plaintiff will usually 
be barred if one of those states would preclude him from bringing 
an action. 
2. Characterization of the Plaintiff's Claim 
Typically, states have established one general limitation period 
to cover actions for any injury to the person or rights of another 
not arising from contract and not otherwise enumerated.156 Suits 
to recover for malpractice of physicians and others rending medical 
treatment,157 as well as for trespass to the person,158 are frequently 
prescribed by a specific limitation. However, a few states have re-
tained the common-law action on the case to designate the provi-
sions applicable to personal injury claims,159 while some others 
include such claims under a blanket section covering all actions 
not otherwise specifically provided for.160 Other statutory classifica-
153 See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 65 (F) 58-59 (1943). Fre-
quently "borrowing" statutes except actions brought by resident plaintiffs. E.g., Du. 
CoDE ANN. tit. 10, § 8120 (1953). Such a provision is not repugnant to the privileges and 
immunities clause in U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 2. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 
(1920). 
15-l See Annot., supra note 152, at 227; Note, 35 CoLUM. L. REv. 762, 770 (1935). 
155 See discussion in Part A supra. 
156 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.05 (1962). 
157 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (1949). 
158 E.g., A.LA. CODE tit. 7, § 21 (1958). 
169 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-11 (1953); MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 57, § 1 (1957). 
160 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 112, § 90 (Supp. 1959); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 722 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25(2) (1953). 
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tions which might be relevant to litigation involving nuclear mis-
haps include general limitation provisions which apply to liabilities 
created by statute where no particular limitation specifically con-
ditions the statutory right,161 and the separate categories applica-
ble to actions for injury to property, both real and personal.162 
Because there are substantial variations in the limitation periods 
governing different types of actions or injuries, characterization of 
the plaintiff's claim may be determinative in a given case. 
Illustratively, in Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co.163 
an action was brought by an employee to recover for personal 
injuries caused by the prolonged inhalation of silica dust. While the 
counts based on the defendant's negligence were barred, the court 
entertained suit on the last count, which charged the employer 
with failure to provide safeguards required by New York's Labor 
Law.164 That statute was construed as placing a duty on the defend-
ant not measured by the usual standard of the reasonably prudent 
man; rather, it imposed an absolute duty to provide adequate and 
proper safeguards. Although the court characterized the action as 
one for recovery upon a liability created by statute and thus ap-
plied the longer limitation period165 to the last count, it qualified 
the holding as follows: 
"We may assume that a 'liability' is not 'created' by statute 
in every case where the statute imposes a new duty or standard 
of care different from that required by custom and common 
law. The statute may be general in character and the statu-
tory duty may be imposed for the general welfare rather than 
for benefit of a person or group of persons. A statute 'creates' 
no liability unless it discloses an intention express or implied 
that from disregard of a statutory command a liability for 
resultant damages shall arise 'which would not exist but for 
the statute.' "166 
Obviously this qualification is significant; moreover, contrary 
authority exists even though the higher statutory standards were 
enacted for the protection of a special class.167 Nevertheless, because 
161 E.g., ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (1961). 
162 For example, distinctions are usually made between actions to recover for injury 
to real property and those for damages resulting from nuisance. See, e.g., Robertson v. 
Cincinnati, N.O. &: Tex. Pac. Ry., 339 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. 1960), 28 TENN. L. REv. 433 (1961). 
163 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936). 
164 N.Y. LABOR LAW § 299. 
165 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 213 (six years). 
166 270 N.Y. 287, 304-05, 200 N.E. at 829. 
167 E.g., Shelton v. Paris, 199 Ore. 365, 261 P.2d 856 (1953). See generally Annot., 
104 A.L.R. 462 (1936). 
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of the numerous statutes and regulations imposing special stand-
ards of care on operators of nuclear facilities, the argument could 
still be made that a statutory liability is created when injury re-
sults from the violation of any such rules. Although such regulatory 
legislation will usually be of the type intended to protect the 
general public, a court might be willing to apply the longer 
limitation period governing statutory claims without accepting the 
exact analysis of the Schmidt decision. 
Radiation damage to real estate may create another situation 
in which the characterization of plaintiff's claim will determine the 
applicable limitation period. Historically, the distinction between 
trespass and an action on the case for invasion of land depended on 
whether the invasion was direct or indirect. Trespass is usually 
defined as interference with the owner's exclusive possession of 
land, while nuisance is regarded as an interference with the use and 
enjoyment of real property. Unless an actor is engaged in an extra-
hazardous activity, an unintentional and nonnegligent invasion of 
another's land usually does not subject him to liability to the 
possessor, despite the fact that harm results.168 Courts generally 
require an intrusion of real property in some palpable form be-
fore it will be deemed a trespass.169 The Oregon Supreme Court, 
however, declined to make such a qualification. In Martin v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co.110 fluoride compounds in gaseous form, not visi-
ble to the naked eye, escaped from defendant's plant and were 
carried onto plaintiff's land during a period of about five years. 
Plaintiff's cattle were poisoned from ingesting the fluorides, which 
had contaminated the forage and water on the land. Defendant 
contended that the invasion was a nuisance, trying to limit re-
covery to damages resulting during the two years prior to suit, the 
statutory period for such an action.171 The court rejected defend-
ant's theory, saying: 
"If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumen-
tality which is used in making an intrusion upon another's 
land we prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather 
than its size. Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any 
intrusion which invades the possessor's protected interest in 
exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or 
168 R.EsTATEMENT, TORTS § 166 (1934). 
169 35 WASH. L. REv. 474 (1960). 
170 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1960). 
171 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.II0 (1961); cf. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 
Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952). 
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invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured 
only by the mathematical language of the physicist."172 
Holding that the defendant's conduct which caused chemical sub-
stances to be deposited upon the plaintiff's land fulfilled all of the 
requirements under the law of trespass, the court applied the 
six-year limitation for trespass to land178 in lieu of the two-year 
limit on an action for nuisance. Obviously, such a decision provides 
direct authority for a radiation case. 
3. Characterization in Federal Courts 
Since Congress has never enacted general statutes of limitations 
for actions brought in federal courts based on state-created rights, 
state limitations have always been applied in such cases, and the 
Rules of Decision Act174 provided the authority for so doing.175 
If the suit was one to enforce a common-law right, the federal 
courts followed the "forum rule," applying the limitations of the 
state in which they were sitting.176 However, when the cause of 
action was based upon statutory liability, and the statute contained 
a special limitation conditioning the right, the entire state act was 
enforced, even though the claim arose in a state other than that in 
which the federal court was sitting.177 In applying the states' 
limitations, federal courts also followed state decisions in inter-
preting the statutes.178 
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,179 only a few significant changes 
have occurred in the manner in which federal courts handle prob-
lems of time limitations. There have been some important devel-
opments with respect to actions for equitable relief, it being now 
well settled that state limitations shall be applied whenever juris-
172 221 Ore. at 94, 342 P.2d at 794. 
178 ORE. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (1961). 
174 "[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or 
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases 
where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789). The current act is in 
28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1958). 
171i See Blume &: George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH, L. REv. 937, 
940 (1951). 
176 Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1850); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 
(13 Pet.) 312 (1839). 
177 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904). 
178 See Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 (1893); Blume &: George, supra note 175, at 
941. 
179 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did 
not affect the application of state time limitations. See Blume &: George, supra note 175, 
at 948. 
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diction is based on diversity of citizenship.180 However, if a feder-
ally-created right is involved, for which the sole remedy is in 
equity, the state's statute does not control, and a federal court is 
free to apply its own conception of the doctrine of laches.181 In-
deed, federal law will always prevail when Congress has created a 
statutory liability which is prescribed by a specific time limitation 
in the federal act.182 Three years after the Erie decision, the Su-
preme Court decided that federal courts must also follow the 
forum state's conflict of laws rules.183 Thus, in deciding which 
limitation it must apply in a diversity case, a federal court will 
first characterize the statute as "substantive" for purposes of the 
Erie doctrine, and then characterize it as "procedural" for purposes 
of conflict of laws. 
When a federally-created claim is involved, but no time limita-
tion has been enacted specifically controlling the statutory right, 
state limitations are usually applied.184 Uniformity is lacking in 
the decisions, however, as to whether federal or state law should 
govern statutory interpretation under these circumstances. On the 
one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that the decision as to 
when the cause of action "accrued" is a federal question;185 how-
ever, when the Court was confronted with a case which called for 
an interpretation of where the claim "arose" to determine which 
state statute was applicable according to the forum state's "borrow-
ing" provision, the Court looked to state law in deciding the 
issue.186 But in suits involving state-created rights, problems of 
statutory construction are to be resolved in accordance with state 
court decisions.187 
It would seem, therefore, that no difference in result can be 
expected when an action to recover for radiation-induced injuries 
is filed in federal district court, jurisdiction being based on diver-
sity of citizenship. However, when the forum state's courts have 
not specifically decided the issue of when a cause of action accrues 
for a delayed manifestation injury, a federal court might be more 
180 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), 44 MICH. L. R.Ev. 477 (1945). 
181 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); cf. Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 
(1947). 
182 Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926). 
188 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
184 State limitations are applied since it seems unlikely that Congress intended to 
create a class of perpetual rights. See Developments in the Law, supra note 140, at 1266. 
185 Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96 (1941). 
186 Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947). 
187 West v. American Tel. &: Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Pickett v. Aglinski, 110 
F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940). 
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willing to look to federal cases, such as Urie v. Thompson,188 for 
analogies in deciding the question in a radiation case.189 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to demonstrate the 
need for a better solution to the problem of the effect of statutes 
of limitations in tort cases involving radiation injuries. Application 
of existing statutory periods and the usual interpretation of when 
a cause of action accrues will make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to recover on many meritorious claims arising from delayed mani-
festation injuries. Even in those states in which the judiciary has 
employed the concept of notice of an injury to the claimant as a 
prerequisite for accrual, the solution is not entirely adequate. Not 
only is there a lack of uniformity in the decisions as to what con-
stitutes sufficient notice, but such a doctrine ignores the unfairness 
to defendants in failing to establish an over-all maximum period 
within which an action must be brought. Moreover, statutory toll-
ing provisions and judicially-created rules suspending the limita-
tion period can be invoked only in particular situations and cannot 
be relied upon to achieve a just solution in many radiation cases. 
Since time limitations for commencing actions at law are entirely 
statutory, the only logical solution is legislative reform. 
Assuming that some change is desirable, decisions must be 
made as to whether action should be taken at the federal or state 
level and what basic ideas should be recommended. One writer 
has proposed that a federal limitation be enacted in conjunction 
with an act creating a federal cause of action based upon strict 
liability.100 On the other hand, it has been suggested that uniform 
state legislation would be the better solution, although a recom-
mendation of congressional action was also indicated.191 A single 
federal statute would certainly offer the advantage of immediate 
uniformity throughout the country and thus avoid the possibility 
of continuing disparateness in limitation periods and interpreta-
tions of when the statutory period starts to run. The current con-
gressional attitude, however, seems to favor state regulation of 
tort liability for radiation injuries. Moreover, some radiation 
188 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see text accompanying note 52 supra. 
180 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955). But cf. 
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1952). 
100 Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 3, 12 (1956). 
101 McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, & Dejarnette, The Statute of Limitations 
Problem in Relation to Atomic Energy Liability, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 347, 360 (1959). 
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source~ might not come within Congress' power to regulate.192 
Consequently, the proposals suggested below are directed to state 
legislators with the hope that some uniformity can be achieved 
with regard to certain basic principles, realizing that exact limita-
tion periods will probably vary from state to state. 
To be reasonable, a limitation statute applicable to radiation 
injuries should provide an over-all period of thirty years from the 
date of exposure. The Commissioners for Uniform State Laws have 
proposed a model statute prescribing an over-all limitation of ten 
years from the exposure date, 193 but this is unrealistic in view of 
current scientific knowledge of the delayed biological effects of 
nuclear radiation. Even if the limitation period is extended, the 
issue of when the statute commences to run remains unsettled un-
less the traditional language of accrual is replaced by a more 
specific event to mark the beginning of the period. Therefore, the 
over-all limitation period should be measured from the date of 
exposure or, if there is a succession of exposures, from the date of 
the last exposure which contributed to the damage suffered by the 
claimant. 
Merely lengthening the limitation period would be a substan-
tial benefit to potential plaintiffs, but it creates an undue burden 
upon defendants who might be amenable to suits for an extended 
time without knowledge of the number or amounts of possible 
claims. Some writers have suggested an alternative limitation 
measured from the date when the injured party knows, or should 
know in the exercise of ordinary care, the nature of his injury and 
the source of the radiation, with a time limit of one or two years. 194 
It would appear, however, that such a provision would apply only 
after a physical manifestation of injury and hence does not neces-
sarily protect the defendant in that situation in which the plaintiff 
knew he was exposed but suffered no actual injury for several 
years. On the other hand, "injury" could be interpreted to include 
the mere exposure to harmful amounts of radiation; thus a claim 
would be barred if suit were not filed within two years after knowl-
edge of exposure. Such an interpretation places a potential claim-
ant in the same precarious position as under present limitations 
statutes, forcing him to prove future damages which may be highly 
192 ATOMS AND THE LAw 574. See also Estep 8: Adelman, State Control of Radiation 
Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1961). 
193 UNIFORM NucLEAR FACILITIES LIABILITY Aar § 5. For a discussion of statutes and 
conventions adopted in Europe to govem limitation periods for radiation cases, see Com-
ment, 13 STAN. L. REv. 865, 869 (1961). 
194 E.g., McNeal, Bloom, Christovich, Cope, Cull, 8: Dejarnette, supra note 191, at 360. 
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speculative, if no physical effect is manifested shortly after he is 
exposed. Therefore, it is assumed that the former interpretation of 
"injury," i.e., a physical manifestation of compensable damage, 
would or at least should be adopted. 
In order to protect defendants adequately, potential claimants 
who have been exposed to radiation should be required to give as 
early notice as possible even if there are no observable physical 
manifestations. Both parties may benefit substantially from such 
a notice requirement. The potential plaintiff could be advised as 
to precautions which he should take against further exposure and 
possibly could receive medical treatment from radiation specialists 
provided or recommended by the potential defendant. Advantages 
accruing to the prospective defendant include the opportunity to 
mitigate damages by providing medical care or periodic examina-
tions to ascertain diseases at the incipient stage and the opportunity 
to preserve evidence of the incident which allegedly resulted in the 
claimant's exposure. To enforce the notice requirement, the rec-
ommended statute would include an alternate limitation period 
of six months or one year after the injured party knows or, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, should know that he was exposed to 
nuclear radiation and the source of the radiation. If the claimant 
does not comply with the statutory procedure for giving notice 
within the specified time, and the potential defendant is not aware 
that this particular person was exposed, any cause of action arising 
from such exposure would be barred. 
As a counterpart to a provision for notice to the defendant, it 
is recommended that some provision be made to inform persons 
who have been exposed to radiation. This should take the form of 
filing a report with the appropriate regulatory agency of all inci-
dents which could possibly endanger persons or property not 
associated with the ownership and operation of the radiation 
source. In addition, if only a limited area or group of persons was 
exposed, personal notice should be given to the victims either by 
the party responsible for the incident or by the agency. Disclosure 
of incidents involving possible exposure of a substantial area or 
segment of the population probably should be handled by public 
officials. 
Although it is contrary to our traditional adversary system to 
require a party to give notice of a possible claim against himself 
to those he may have injured, the peculiar nature of nuclear radia-
tion and its delayed effects makes it imperative that some new pro-
cedures be adopted. To effectuate the requirement that notice be 
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given by the potential defendant, the statute of limitations should 
provide that the period will not begin until the defendant has com-
plied with the specified notice filing procedure if he knows or, in 
the exercise of ordinary care, should know of the incident causing 
the alleged injury. As a consequence of the two notice provisions, 
much of the hesitancy to adopt a thirty-year over-all limitation 
period should be alleviated. 
The modifications already suggested should provide for those 
cases in which all physical manifestations are long delayed. Two 
other types of cases must be considered, however, in which an 
unconditional blanket thirty-year extension of the limitations 
period would be unfair. If injurious and compensable injuries 
occur at any time during the thirty-year period, suit should be 
brought immediately, just as for nonradiation injuries. Whatever 
the period generally applicable-six months, a year, or two years-
the same limitation should apply to radiation injuries once the 
plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, 
of the nature of the injury, causal connection to a particular radia-
tion source, and the identity of the potential defendant. Establish-
ment of the thirty-year period should not permit such a person any 
additional time for bringing suit. 
Creation of a thirty-year over-all period necessitates special 
provision for a second category of cases. Some actionable manifesta-
tions of overexposure to radiation may appear long before the 
thirty-year period, but other equally actionable consequences from 
the same overexposure may be delayed for many years. Under the 
typical judicial approach in tort cases a cause of action may not be 
split, hence all damages for future injuries must be sought when 
first seeking any recovery. This dilemma is difficult enough in 
some nonradiation cases and will present almost impossible com-
plications when radiation injuries are involved. The difficulties 
created by application of existing case law have been discussed in 
detail elsewhere, and a new contingent injury fund approach to 
many radiation injury cases has been suggested.195 Until a signifi-
cantly different solution is adopted, however, limitations provisions 
under normal tort rules must be modified to take care of the case 
in which some perhaps unknown, or at least uncertain-to-happen 
manifestations may arise long after suit could have been brought 
for the first clearly actionable manifestation. One solution would 
195 Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury 
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259 (1960). See also Estep & Forgotson, Legal Liability for 
Genetic Injuries From Radiation, 24 LA. L. REv. 1 (1963). 
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be simply to permit complete splitting of causes of action in all 
such cases. Certainly this is preferable to either allowing juries or 
judges to speculate about the possibilities of future effects or deny-
ing recovery altogether unless the chances are better than :fifty 
percent.196 In most cases, however, this drastic splitting solution 
will cause unnecessary duplication in trial of such cases. Instead, 
a modified splitting of future and uncertain injuries from those 
presently actionable should be permitted. Rather than an action 
for these uncertain later manifestations, suit should be permitted 
after actual manifestation of a specific new injury, provided it is 
brought within the usual short time after manifestation and 
knowledge of causal connection to defendant's radiation source, 
and, in any event, within the over-all thirty-year period. This 
solution will unsettle somewhat the present doctrines of :finality 
in tort cases, but the existing rules clearly are unsatisfactory for 
future injuries, particularly in radiation cases. The French have 
been able to live with a similar kind of uncertainty,197 and surely 
we can do so when it is so important to justice in radiation cases. 
The details of such a plan probably should be worked out on a 
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the statutory modifications of limi-
tations provisions should specifically direct the judiciary to change 
the common-law rule. The statutory amendment should also direct 
the courts to work out satisfactory rules as to the finality of that 
part of the earlier trial which would be the same for all injuries 
caused by the radiation overexposure. Use of some existing con-
cepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel might provide a solu-
tion in some jurisdictions, but this should not be left to chance. 
When amending the rules by statute as here suggested, specific 
direction should be given to the courts to make as much of the 
earlier trial as possible conclusive in subsequent trials, and to per-
mit only that evidence which would show the extent and causal 
connection to radiation of the new injurious manifestations. 
A few additional problems remain to be considered. The ques-
tion of liability for genetic injuries has been considered else-
where.198 Whether or not a cause of action is recognized, the limita-
tion statute recommended above should be applied with the period 
commencing on the date of the exposure of the ancestor. It should 
be specified that the over-all limitation period cannot be tolled or 
suspended for any reason other than the failure of the defendant 
100 Ibid. See also ATOMS AND THE LAw 465-527. 
107 ATOMS AND THE LAW 527·32. 
108 See Estep &: Forgotson, supra note 195. 
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to file the required report of a nuclear incident. This should not, 
however, preclude a contract between parties providing for pay-
ment in the event an injury develops beyond the statutory period. 
The amendment, however, should specifically preclude an action 
against an unknown tort-feasor which would suspend the running 
of the statute. Finally, it is recommended that all suits based upon 
death acts be specifically barred within the over-all period of thirty 
years following the exposure of the decedent. 
Any proposal to extend substantially the statute of limitations 
governing actions for personal injury damage may create an illu-
sion that the responsible party in every case will now be amenable 
to suit for thirty years. During such a period many potential de-
fendants will have moved or disappeared and some corporations 
will have been dissolved and liquidated.199 But these problems can-
not be solved by a limitations provision; it is better not to foreclose 
a remedy in every case merely because a few radiation victims may 
fail to recover because of the disappearance of the responsible 
party.200 
Some steps must be taken to provide a realistic limitation period 
for radiation injuries, keeping in mind the interests of both parties 
involved in litigation and the public policy of proscribing stale 
and fraudulent claims. The changes suggested here should correct 
the most important defects of existing statutes. They should be con-
sidered and adopted by each jurisdiction. 
199 Determining liability of directors and stockholders upon liquidation is sometimes 
complicated but if properly carried out there would be no continuing liability after 
liquidation. See LATIIN, CORPORATIONS ch. 12, § 11 (1959). 
200 If the contingent injury fund suggested elsewhere were used this problem would 
also be solved because contributions would be made immediately for increased possibili• 
ties of future injuries. See material cited in notes 195, 196 supra. 
